Complimentary vs. Competitive Cognitive Artifacts: Tools That Shape Human Intelligence
Introduction
Human intelligence has never been a closed system. From tally marks on bones to modern artificial intelligence, our minds have always extended into tools, symbols, and cultural practices. Cognitive scientists frame this in two related concepts: distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995), which emphasizes that thinking occurs across people and artifacts, and the extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), which argues that tools can become integral components of cognition itself.
But not all tools function in the same way. Some artifacts strengthen cognition by scaffolding thought and cultivating skills, while others diminish it by substituting for mental processes. This essay distinguishes between complimentary cognitive artifacts—which support, extend, and reinforce intelligence—and competitive cognitive artifacts—which replace or undermine it. A third category includes dual-nature artifacts that move between these roles depending on context and user engagement.
Complimentary Cognitive Artifacts: Partners in Thought
Complimentary artifacts increase intelligence by requiring active engagement. They help humans offload complexity in ways that develop rather than diminish capacity. Lev Vygotsky (1978) described this dynamic as scaffolding: tools create a “zone of proximal development,” allowing learners to perform beyond their independent capabilities while gradually internalizing new skills.
A Dozen Examples
- Pencils and pens – Writing externalizes thought, enabling reflection, planning, and deeper encoding into memory (Scribner & Cole, 1981).
- Abacuses – Users manipulate beads to visualize number relationships, strengthening arithmetic and spatial reasoning (Ifrah, 2001).
- Sextants – Require navigators to integrate geometry, astronomy, and measurement into skilled practice.
- Maps (paper) – Demand interpretation of symbols, scale, and orientation, building spatial intelligence (Montello, 2002).
- Slide rules – Teach mathematical relationships by requiring users to understand logarithmic scales.
- Compasses – Develop geographic awareness and orientation skills.
- Notebooks and journals – Encourage metacognition, critical thinking, and long-term recall (Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014).
- Chalkboards and whiteboards – Extend individual and group cognition by making ideas visible and manipulable.
- Knitting patterns and sheet music – Encode symbolic and procedural knowledge that requires interpretation.
- Paper calendars and planners – Reinforce active temporal reasoning and planning skills.
- Analog clocks – Foster intuitive understanding of cyclical time, unlike digital readouts.
- Mathematical proofs and diagrams – Force structured reasoning and logical inference.
These tools act as partners in thought. Like weights in a gym, they not only make the task possible but also strengthen the user in the process.
Competitive Cognitive Artifacts: Substitutes for Thinking
In contrast, competitive artifacts replace cognitive effort with automation, often eroding human capacities. Don Norman (1991) described these as knowledge in the world: answers embedded in artifacts that require little to no mental effort. While efficient, they risk making the mind passive.
A Dozen Examples
- GPS devices – Provide directions but undermine spatial memory and hippocampal activity (Maguire et al., 2000).
- Spell checkers/autocorrect – Reduce spelling and grammatical awareness over time.
- Calculators (for basic tasks) – Deskilling in arithmetic when over-relied upon.
- Search engines – Encourage shallow recall and externalized memory (Sparrow et al., 2011).
- Learning Management Systems (ELMS) – Centralize resources but risk passive consumption of information.
- Digital calendars with reminders – Shift responsibility for time management from internal memory to external alarms.
- Smart thermostats – Replace sensitivity to environmental cues with automation.
- Voice assistants – Provide instant answers without requiring reasoning or recall.
- Navigation autopilots – Decrease situational awareness in aviation and driving (Endsley, 1995).
- Grammarly and editing AIs – Substitute for understanding grammar and syntax.
- Cloud-synced e-book highlights – Risk reducing active annotation into passive storage.
- Cooking robots and automated appliances – Eliminate experiential learning of timing, smell, and judgment.
These tools compete with cognition by displacing it. They deliver results but reduce resilience, depth, and adaptive capacity in the humans who depend on them.
Dual-Nature Artifacts: Intelligence on a Spectrum
Many tools cannot be neatly categorized. They shift between complimentary and competitive functions depending on design, intention, and use. Edwin Hutchins (1995), in his study of ship navigation, showed that artifacts are always part of a system of practice: whether they build or diminish intelligence depends on how humans interact with them.
A Dozen Examples
- Calculators – Can undermine basic arithmetic, or enable exploration of advanced mathematics.
- Computers – Can replace memory, or serve as platforms for creative modeling and programming.
- Spreadsheets – Encourage shallow formula dependence, or sharpen logical reasoning when constructed thoughtfully.
- Digital note-taking apps – Passive copy-pasting weakens memory, but active annotation deepens learning.
- E-books – Promote skimming, or, with active highlighting, enable deeper comprehension.
- Smartphones – Crutches for distraction, or powerful portable labs for learning.
- Translation tools – Can discourage language learning, or scaffold second-language acquisition.
- Video tutorials – Can be passively consumed, or actively practiced alongside.
- Flashcard apps – Ineffective when skimmed, potent when using active recall (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).
- AI systems – Can deskill through instant answers, or augment cognition as thought partners (Clark, 2003).
- Digital calendars – Can act as mere crutches, or scaffold advanced scheduling and planning.
- Data visualization platforms – Can obscure data through design, or amplify insight if used critically.
These artifacts demonstrate that intelligence is relational: the same tool can either atrophy or amplify cognition depending on how it is situated in human practice.
Theoretical Implications
- Extended Mind Thesis – Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue that when tools are reliably integrated into cognitive processes, they become part of the mind itself. The quality of that integration—complimentary or competitive—determines whether intelligence is strengthened or weakened.
- Distributed Cognition – Hutchins (1995) emphasizes that cognition is socially and materially situated. Artifacts are not external aids but integral to thinking systems. Whether they support or replace intelligence depends on system design.
- Cognitive Offloading – Sparrow et al. (2011) showed that humans increasingly rely on external sources for memory. Offloading can free cognitive resources, but chronic reliance can deskill.
- Situated Learning – Lave & Wenger (1991) suggest that learning occurs in practice communities. Tools that invite participation strengthen intelligence; tools that bypass it diminish learning.
Conclusion
The history of cognitive artifacts teaches us that intelligence is not a fixed trait but a relationship—between humans, their tools, and their environments.
- Complimentary artifacts (pencils, maps, abacuses) strengthen cognition by scaffolding thought.
- Competitive artifacts (GPS, spell checkers, autopilots) weaken cognition by replacing thought.
- Dual-nature artifacts (calculators, AI, smartphones) remind us that the impact depends on use, context, and intentionality.
The challenge of our time is not whether to embrace tools but how to design and use them as collaborators in thought rather than as substitutes for it. Our future intelligence depends on keeping the human–artifact relationship complimentary.
References
- Clark, A. (2003). Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
- Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.
- Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 32–64.
- Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press.
- Ifrah, G. (2001). The Universal History of Numbers. Wiley.
- Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. Cambridge University Press.
- Maguire, E. A., et al. (2000). Navigation-related structural change in the hippocampi of taxi drivers. PNAS, 97(8), 4398–4403.
- Montello, D. (2002). Cognitive map-design research in the twentieth century. Cartography and Geographic Information Science.
- Mueller, P., & Oppenheimer, D. (2014). The pen is mightier than the keyboard. Psychological Science, 25(6), 1159–1168.
- Norman, D. A. (1991). Things That Make Us Smart: Defending Human Attributes in the Age of the Machine. Basic Books.
- Roediger, H. L., & Karpicke, J. D. (2006). Test-enhanced learning. Psychological Science, 17(3), 249–255.
- Scribner, S., & Cole, M. (1981). The Psychology of Literacy. Harvard University Press.
- Sparrow, B., Liu, J., & Wegner, D. M. (2011). Google effects on memory. Science, 333(6043), 776–778.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in Society. Harvard University Press.